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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS - LIABILITY OF PURCHASING CORPORATION AS TO
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DISSOLVED VENDOR CORPORATION - PIERC-
ING THE CORPORATE VEIL. - A Corporation voluntarily dissolved
after a National Labor Relations Board order to reinstate em-
ployees. B Corporation purchased the property of A Corporation,
distributing stock to the stockholders of the latter in payment. X
and Y, president and vice-president of A Corporation, personally
purchased the property from B Corporation and formed three new
corporations to carry on the same kind of business. Their directors.
officers, and stockholders were practically the same as those of the
old corporation. In a contempt proceeding for violation of the
Labor Board order it was held, for defendants, that the dissolution
of A Corporation was complete and the organization of the new
corporation no mere continuation of it. National Labor Relations
Board v. Tupelo Garment Co.'
How far may a corporation purchasing the assets of a dis-
solved corporation be held for the obligations of the latter? A
number of issues are involved, all centering on whether the new
corporation is really a new entity or a mere continuation of the
old with a "new coat of paint". If a continuation, the new or
purchasing corporation is liable by implication on the seller's con-
tracts and other obligations.- The basic condition requisite to in-
sulate the purchaser from liability is good faith.' To prove good
faith, the purchasing corporation must have paid a valuable con-
sideration, 4 which means something other than stock in the pur-
chasing corporation' and which must be sufficient not to prejudice
creditors of the seller.8 Whether the directors, officers, and stock-
holders of the new corporation are the same as the old is another
relevant inquiry. Such a situation will cast suspicion on the new
corporation, although, absent other indications of fraud, duplica-
tion in personnel will not per se make the purchasing corporation
liable.
7
1122 F. (2d) 603 (C4 C. A. 5th, 1941).
2 Stanford Hotel Co. v. Schwind Co., 180 Cal. 348, 181 Pac. 780 (1919).
3 15 FLETCHER, CYLCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rov. ed.
1938) § 7125.
4 Grinnel v. Detroit Gas Co., 112' Mich. 70, 70 N. W. 413 (1897) ; American
Railway Express Co. v. Downing, 132 Va. 139, 111 S. E. 265 (1922).
5 Friedenwald Co. v. Asheville Tobacco Works, 117 N. C. 544, 23 S. E. 490
(1895) ; Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 171 C. C. A. 195, 260 Fed. 159
(C. C. A. 8th, 1919). Contra: Swing v. Empire Lumber Co., 105 Minn. 356,
117 N. W. 467 (1908).
619 C. J. S. 1397.
7 Anderson v. War Eagle Consol. Mining Co., 8 Idaho 789, 72 Pac. 671
(1903) ; Carter Coal Co. v. Clouse, 163 Ky. 337, 173 S. W. 794 (1915).
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The possibility of collusion between the old and the new cor-
poration will be investigated. A collusive transfer of assets will be
a fraud upon creditors.8 A leading M{assachusetts case9 closely
analogous to the instant case held a new corporation talng over
the assets of an old not liable on the predecessor's contract to hire,
although admittedly the motive was to escape that existing obli-
gation. That case has been criticised as sanctioning fraudulent
use of the corporate fiction to avoid present obligations."0 Assuming
that there should be some limit on the legal incidents of corporate
personality, courts disregard the theory of a separate legal entity
only if it is used to perpetrate fraud."
There was no need in the present case to pierce the corporate
veil since there was no outward showing of fraud. True, B Cor-
poration paid for the assets of A Corporation in stock,12 but no
point was made of this; nor was there any allegation that the pur-
chase by X and Y from B Corporation was not for value. Allega-
tions of fraud in dissolving A Corporation and in forming the three
new corporations were unsupported by adequate evidence. The
substantial identity of directors, officers, and stockholders, unsup-
ported by evidence of fraud, does not render the purchasing cor-
poration liable for contempt."
The question remains whether the court decree enforcing the
Labor Board order is such that, like a judgment," it might follow
the property and bind the new corporations. The cases are silent
upon the point. Were such the case the decree would operate in
reiz and the theory of the corporate entity remain intact. Properly,
it would seem, the decree should be enforced in personam, since
s BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 237.
" Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N. E. 601 (1933).
10 Comments (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 135, (1934) 32 MIH. L. REv. 553,
(1934) 18 MINx. L. REv. 559.
11 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 6; Canfield, Scope and Limits of the Entity
Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 128, 192: "Such being the legal conception of
the nature of a corporation justice requires that the principle of law which is
based upon it should be firmly and consistently applied."
12 The petition averred that B Corporation had paid for the property of A
Corporation in stock. The opinion of the court lacks comment upon this
factor even though it is generally held that payment in stock for property
of a corporation is insufficient consideration to render the purchasing cor-
poration immune from the obligations of the vendor. 15 FLETrHE, op. cit.
supra n. 3, at § 7127.
13 Anderson v. War Eagle Consol. Mining Co., 8 Idaho 783, 72 Pac. 671
(1903); Carter Coal Co. v. Clouse, 163 Ky. 337, 173 S. W. 794 (1915) ; George
E. Warner Co. v. A. L. Black Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920):
",If the sale was fair and free from fraud, and there is no averment or showing
to the contrary, the purchaser would take it [property] discharged of the
debtor obligations."
'4 15 FLETCHER, op cit. supra n1. 3, at § 7103.
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the directors and stockholders of the new corporation are the same
as those of the old. This, however, would necessitate piercing the
corporate veil, which courts hesitate to do unless fraud appears.
Therefore, that the court's failure to pass upon the question seems
justified. 5
W. H. S.
DIVORCE - COLLATERAL ATTACK BY SUBSEQUENT SPOUSE-
ESTOPPEL. - P, inducing and aiding D to divorce H, in Tennessee,
so that she might marry him, told D not to bother to have her at-
torney correct an allegation in her bill that H probably claimed
legal residence in Massachusetts. The Tennessee court, finding H
to be a nonresident, gave H notice by publication only. H did'not
appear and he never objected to the divorce decree. On the con-
trary he relied upon it and married another woman. P married
D immediately after the divorce and lived with her for nearly seven
years. He sought to annul this marriage on the ground that the
divorce was invalid, first, because the Tennessee court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, as the parties were not domiciled
in that state; and second, because if H were domiciled in Tennessee,
the divorce decree was lacking in due process for want of sufficient
notice to H. Held, that the parties were domiciled in Tennessee,
but P is estopped to question the validity of the notice to H. Saul
v. Saul.'
The question as to whether a subsequent spouse of a party to
a divorce may collaterally attack that divorce is one which can not
be answered categorically. There is great confusion among the
cases, which show a conflict in the generalities of language em-
ployed, as well as in the holdings. The answer is that the later
spouse may or may not be allowed to collaterally attack the divorce
depending on many varied circumstances. One observation worthy
of note is the fact that in former cases no distinction had been
drawn between cases involving lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the divorce, as when neither party has established a
domicil in the divorce forum, and cases involving lack of juris-
diction over the person of the nonresident defendant. Total lack
of power in a court to deal with the subject matter of a suit goes
125 Cf. Southport Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., 62 S. Ct. 452, 86 L. Ed. 397
(U. S. 1942).
'122 F. (2d) 64 (App. D. 0. 1941).
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